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Abstract
Background: Disease registers aim to collect information about all instances of a disease or
condition in a defined population of individuals. Traditionally methods of operating disease registers
have required that notifications of cases be identified by unique identifiers such as social security
number or national identification number, or by ensembles of non-unique identifying data items,
such as name, sex and date of birth. However, growing concern over the privacy and confidentiality
aspects of disease registers may hinder their future operation. Technical solutions to these
legitimate concerns are needed.
Discussion: An alternative method of operation is proposed which involves splitting the personal
identifiers from the medical details at the source of notification, and separately encrypting each part
using asymmetrical (public key) cryptographic methods. The identifying information is sent to a
single Population Register, and the medical details to the relevant disease register. The Population
Register uses probabilistic record linkage to assign a unique personal identification (UPI) number
to each person notified to it, although not necessarily everyone in the entire population. This UPI
is shared only with a single trusted third party whose sole function is to translate between this UPI
and separate series of personal identification numbers which are specific to each disease register.
Summary:  The system proposed would significantly improve the protection of privacy and
confidentiality, while still allowing the efficient linkage of records between disease registers, under
the control and supervision of the trusted third party and independent ethics committees. The
proposed architecture could accommodate genetic databases and tissue banks as well as a wide
range of other health and social data collections. It is important that proposals such as this are
subject to widespread scrutiny by information security experts, researchers and interested
members of the general public, alike.
Background
Disease registers aim to collect information about all in-
stances of a disease or condition in a defined population
of individuals. Usually the population covered by a dis-
ease register is defined geographically – for example, all
people resident in a particular jurisdiction – and such reg-
isters are generally referred to a being "population-based".
However, disease registers can also have a more limited
scope, such as all people covered by a particular health in-
surer regardless of where they live, or all people using a
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particular health facility, although such registers are often
referred to as "research databases".
The core function of most disease registers is to measure
the incidence or prevalence of their target disease or con-
dition, although many registers have additional func-
tions, such as providing population-based cases for case-
control or cohort studies, and collecting information
which can be used to monitor the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of health care delivery [1].
Cancer registries are perhaps the best-known and well-es-
tablished type of population-based disease register. How-
ever, in the last few decades, other types of disease register
have started to appear. These include registers of birth de-
fects, diabetes and chronic infectious diseases. This trend
seems likely to accelerate, as technical advances in com-
puting and digital communications decrease the cost of
establishing and operating disease register databases, as
well as broadening the scope of information which can
feasibly be collected by them.
These advances also pose a number of concomitant chal-
lenges. One particular challenge – that of protecting indi-
vidual privacy and maintaining confidentiality in an
environment in which large volumes of health informa-
tion can be copied and transmitted ad infinitum in just sec-
onds – is attracting increasing attention from health care
providers, regulators and consumers alike.
Anderson has observed:
"The likelihood that unauthorised use will be made of in-
formation is a function of its value and the number of
people who have access to it; and consolidating valuable
private information, such as medical records, into large
databases increases both of these risk factors simultane-
ously" [2].
Examples of these concerns can be found in recent debates
in Britain over the automatic transfer, either with or with-
out explicit and informed consent, of personal health in-
formation to cancer registries, and in Iceland over the
establishment of a far more general health research data-
base [3][4][5][6][7][8][9].
This paper does not attempt to address the societal issues
underlying such debates. It does however propose an in-
formation system architecture and method of operation
which would enhance the protection afforded to the large
volumes of highly confidential personal health informa-
tion which disease registers and other centralised health
databases necessarily accumulate.
Discussion
Traditional disease registers
Traditionally, disease registers have required that health
service providers notify them of each case (instance) of the
target disease or condition occurring in a population by
sending them the medical or other substantive details of
the case, together with identifying information for the per-
son in whom the case has occurred.
Notifications to most disease registers need to be identi-
fied in this way to enable the register to assemble a single
record for each unique case of the target disease from the
multiple notifications which might be received about that
case. For example, a patient might receive a clinical diag-
nosis of a particular type of cancer from their general prac-
titioner (family physician), who will send a notification to
the relevant cancer registry. A fine needle biopsy of the tu-
mour may be taken, and this will result in the histopathol-
ogy laboratory sending another notification to the cancer
registry. The patient may then be admitted to hospital for
surgery, which results in yet another notification of the
same case to the cancer registry. In the absence of a univer-
sally shared electronic health record for each patient, such
redundancy in the notification process is unavoidable, be-
cause each potential notifier has no way of knowing
whether anyone else has notified that particular case to
the relevant disease register. Redundancy in notification is
also desirable because it minimises the likelihood of a
case being overlooked by the disease register. However, it
also means that the disease register must be able to deter-
mine that all these notifications relate to a single case of
disease in a single individual. Typically, this is done by ex-
amining the identifying information associated with each
notification and checking to see if that information
matches with any cases already on the database main-
tained by the register.
Disease registers have successfully used this method of op-
eration for many decades. However recent advances in
computing, cryptography and communication networks
have made alternative methods of operation feasible. Be-
fore considering one such alternative method of opera-
tion, some enabling technology and underlying concepts
will be reviewed briefly.
Public key cryptography
Public key cryptography uses properties of large prime
numbers to encrypt data using a pair of complementary
keys (equivalent to passwords) belonging to each party
wishing to exchange information in private. These keys
are known as the public key and the private key. The pub-
lic key is published and can used by anyone wishing to en-
crypt information in such a way that it can only be
decrypted (read) by the holder of the matching private
key, and by no-one else. In practice, for reasons of compu-BMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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tational efficiency, public key encryption and decryption
algorithms are used to pass random "session keys" secure-
ly between parties and these session keys are used with
conventional encryption algorithms to protect the actual
data – however, the effect is the same as if the entire mes-
sage were encrypted or decrypted using public or private
keys. Each party's private key can also be used to digitally
"sign" messages to prove to the recipient that the party
sending the message is in fact whom they claim to be and
that the message has not been altered during the transmis-
sion process. Usually a trusted agency known as a certifi-
cate authority handles the distribution of public keys and
vouches for the authenticity of these keys and the bona
fides of the parties to whom they belong. Together, this
technology is often referred to as "public key infrastruc-
ture" (PKI) [10][11].
Degrees of identifiability
The definitions of the degrees of identifiability of personal
data which will be used in this paper are as follows. These
definitions are not intended to be completely general, and
relate only to "microdata", in which each record repre-
sents an individual or an event associated with an individ-
ual, and not to aggregated data. Quantin et al. provide a
more general discussion of the issue of identifiability [12].
Standard nomenclature and definitions in this area are
badly needed.
Directly identifying data items contains sufficient informa-
tion to allow individuals to be identified or located easily
in the absence of additional information. For example,
name or residential address are directly identifying data
items. Note that the identification does not need to be un-
ambiguous – a particular residential address may be
shared by a small number of individuals, but knowledge
of it may still compromise the privacy or confidentiality of
one of those individuals.
Indirectly identifying data items allow the direct identifiers
of individuals to be found using additional, accessible ex-
ternal information. Most telephone numbers are indirectly
identifying because the name, address and other character-
istics of the individuals associated with that number can
be obtained by reverse look-up of public telephone lists,
or perhaps by simply calling the number. Whether identi-
fication numbers assigned to individuals by government
institutions, or commercial organisations, are indirectly
identifying depends on: how widely used that class of iden-
tification number is; and how easily accessible the addi-
tional information associated with the number is. Credit
card numbers are indirectly identifying because a record of
the card number plus the owner's name (and, often, their
signature) is left behind with the vendor every time the
card is used. In most cases social security numbers, na-
tional healthcare identification numbers or driver's li-
cense numbers should also should be regarded as
indirectly identifying because the names, address and other
personal details associated with them are easily accessible
to very large numbers of public servants. The existence of
legal and administrative sanctions against the misuse of
such access does not guarantee that misuse will not, in
fact, occur.
Potentially re-identifiable data contains sufficient, usually
non-unique, data items to allow identification of individ-
uals to whom the data relate with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Additional information, which may require
considerable effort to assemble or which may be not be
publicly accessible, will often be required to achieve this
re-identification. However, it can never be assumed that
hostile third parties do not have access to such informa-
tion – indeed, the range of additional information availa-
ble to third parties can never be known in advance. For
example, by using sources such as electoral rolls it may be
possible to narrow down a combination of date of birth
and locality of residence to just a handful of individuals.
This issue has been investigated in detail by Sweeney and
others [13][14].
Anonymous data does not permit re-identification of indi-
viduals with anything more than a negligible degree of
certainty, no matter how much additional information is
available to a third party.
The main design goal for the system proposed in this pa-
per is the separation of directly and indirectly identifying
data items from medical information and other substan-
tive details at the earliest opportunity, and the rigorous
maintenance of the separation thenceforth.
Elements of the proposed information system architecture
A Disease Register is an organisation which collects rele-
vant information about all incident or prevalent cases of a
particular disease or condition which occur in a defined
population. The information collected usually comprises
demographic attributes and details of the specific diagno-
sis, disease or condition, but may include information
about the treatment, complications and outcomes in each
case.
Health Care Providers are organisations or individuals
which provide some form of health care service to patients
(persons) and which are therefore in a position to capture
the information about cases and related health events
which might be required by a Disease Register. Health Care
Providers include hospitals, general practitioners (family
physicians) and pathology laboratories.
A Notifiable Health Event is any event about which a Dis-
ease Register requires information. Examples of NotifiableBMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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Health Events might include the diagnosis of a new case of
cancer, an admission to hospital for a particular reason, or
births and deaths (in which case the statutory body re-
sponsible for registering vital events is regarded as a type
of Health Care Provider).
The Population Register is a trusted agency which is organi-
sationally and physically distinct from all other parties
which participate in the system. The function of the Popu-
lation Register is to maintain a database of personal identi-
fying information, such as name, date of birth, sex,
country of birth and residential addresses. The database is
used to assign a unique Population Register Identifier (ID),
typically a number, to each person of whom the Population
Register is notified, which is not necessarily every person
in the wider population. However, unlike other widely
used unique health care identifiers, such as the NHS
Tracking Number in the UK, the Population Register ID has
very limited scope and is divulged to only one other party:
the Identifier Translation Agency.
The Identifier Translation Agency is another trusted third
party which is also organisationally and physically dis-
tinct from all other parties, including the Population Regis-
ter, which participate in the system. Its role is to translate
the unique identifier assigned to each person by the Popu-
lation Register into a separate unique identifier which is
specific to both each person and to each of the Disease Reg-
isters which participate in the system. This person/Disease
Register-specific identifier (again, typically a number) also
has very limited exposure and scope: it is shared only with
the Disease Register to which it relates and with no-one
else. The Identifier Translation Agency also provides tempo-
rary storage and forwarding facilities for encrypted mes-
sages.
Figure 1
Method of operation. This graph should be examined in conjunction with the commentary provided in the text.
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Method of operation
The following operations correspond to the numbered
data flows and procedures shown in Figure 1.
1. A Health Care Provider produces or captures information
about a Notifiable Health Event, such as the diagnosis of a
case of cancer.
2. The Health Care Provider's information system sends a
Health Event Notification message to the Identifier Transla-
tion Agency. This message comprises two parts. The first
part contains only the personal identifying details (such
as name, address and date of birth) of the person to whom
the Notifiable Health Event relates. These identifying details
are encrypted by the Health Care Provider's information
system using the public key of the Population Register, ef-
fectively rendering the information unreadable by any
party other than the Population Register. The second part of
the message contains only the medical or other details of
the Notifiable Health Event in question, but not the person-
al identifiers of the person to whom it relates. This second
part is also encrypted prior to dispatch, this time using the
public key of the target Disease Register for this particular
Notifiable Health Event. This renders the information un-
readable by any party other than the target Disease Register.
3. Upon receipt of the Health Event Notification message,
the Identifier Translation Agency "unpacks" the two parts
and tags each with the same arbitrary, unique random
number (a "nonce") for tracking purposes. The first part of
the message, which contains the encrypted personal iden-
tifiers, is forwarded to the Population Register in the form
of a request to retrieve the Population Register ID for that
person. The purpose of interposing the Identifier Transla-
tion Agency between the Health Care Provider and the Pop-
ulation Register is to prevent the Population Register from
discovering the source of the Health Event Notification mes-
sage and thereby being able to infer information about the
Notifiable Health Event which triggered it. The Identifier
Translation Agency may need to randomly delay, re-order
or batch the messages it sends to the Population Register to
achieve this goal. The Identifier Translation Agency also
temporarily stores the second part of the Health Event No-
tification message, which contains the encrypted medical
details of the Notifiable Health Event in question.
4. Upon receipt of a look-up request message, the Popula-
tion Register uses its private key to decrypt the personal
identifying information which the message contains and
attempts to match this information against its database of
persons. Probabilistic record linkage or other "fuzzy", er-
ror-tolerant matching techniques would be used for this
matching or "lookup" operation, possibly assisted by hu-
man intervention where required. If a match can be made,
then the previously assigned Population Register unique
identifier (Population Register ID) for that person is re-
trieved, otherwise that set of identifying information is
added to the database as a previously unencountered per-
son to whom a new Population Register ID is assigned.
5. The Population Register ID which has been retrieved or
assigned is encrypted using the public key of the Identifier
Translation Agency and returned to it, together with the
nonce, in the form of a response message.
6. The Identifier Translation Agency maintains a database
which maps each Population Register ID to a series of
unique alternative ID numbers which are specific to each
combination of a person and a Disease Register. The Iden-
tifier Translation Agency uses its private key to decrypt the
response message which it has received from the Popula-
tion Register and extracts the Population Register ID con-
tained in it, together with the nonce which identifies the
message. The Identifier Translation Agency then uses the
nonce to retrieve the temporarily stored second part of the
Health Event Notification message which it received previ-
ously from the Health Service Provider. From this it deter-
mines to which Disease Register the information should be
sent. It then uses the Population Register ID to retrieve from
its translation table the corresponding person/Disease Reg-
ister-specific ID, or if one does not exist, it assigns one.
7. The person/Disease Register-specific ID is encrypted using
the public key of the target Disease Register and packaged
with the retrieved medical details of the Notifiable Health
Event (which are still encrypted with the private key of the
target Disease Register) and the nonce. This package is sent
as a message to the target Disease Register.
8. The target Disease Register decrypts both parts of the
message using its private key and updates its database
with the medical details of the person identified by the
person/Disease Register-specific ID, without needing to
know the identity of the person to whom that person/Dis-
ease Register-specific ID relates. The nonce is used to guard
against replay attacks – the Disease Register database is up-
dated with data associated with a particular nonce only
once.
Table 1 illustrates this sequence of events expressed in
protocol engineering notation.
In practice, each element of the system would acknowl-
edge the receipt of messages and periodically re-send un-
acknowledged messages in order to guarantee delivery.
These "handshaking" messages are not shown in Figure 1
in the interests of clarity. In addition, a cryptographic hash
of each message would be encrypted by the message orig-
inator using its private key, and this electronic signature
would be decrypted by each recipient using the public keyBMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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of the message originator and verified against the actual
message. The combination of strong encryption to protect
the message "payloads", digital signatures to detect for-
gery and tampering, and handshaking protocols to guar-
antee delivery means that any widely accepted store-and-
forward delivery mechanism, such as Internet (SMTP) e-
mail, could be safely used to convey the messages between
parties. The inevitable delays in transmission and process-
ing of messages are unlikely to be a problem because dis-
ease registers are rarely required to operate on a real-time
or near real-time basis.
Linking data for research purposes
So far, discussion has centred around the partitioning, at
source, of notifications into: a) a directly  and indirectly
identifiable segment; and b) a potentially re-identifiable seg-
ment, and the strict maintenance of this separation subse-
quently. However, the system as proposed above also
permits information from different Disease Registers to be
efficiently linked at the level of individuals without the
need for researchers or any of the Disease Registers in-
volved to have access to any directly or indirectly identifying
information.
We will first introduce some additional elements.
Table 1: Method of operation
Notation
PTj Patient j
HCPi Health Care Provider i
ITA Identifier Translation Agency
PR Population Register
DRi Disease Register i
NHEPID Personal identifying deatils for a Notifiable Health Event
NHEMED Medical details for a Notifiable Health Event
{NHEPID}KPR NHEPID encrypted with the public key of PR
{NHEMED}KDRi NHEMED encrypted with the public key of DRi
NA   nonce (number-used-once)
prlu() Population Register look-up, returns a PRID
PRID Population Register ID number
italu() Identifier Translation Agency look-up, returns a PDRID
drlu() Returns the name of a Disease Register, given a nonce
PDRID person/Disease Register-specific ID number
drup() Updates a Disease Register database with the NHEMED for a particular PDRID.
Protocol
1. PTj → HCPi : NHEPID,NHEMED
2. HCP → ITA : {{NHEPID}KPR,{NHEMED}KDRi}KITA
3. ITA → PR : {{NHEPID}KPR, N}KPR
4. PR : PRID = prlu(NHEPID)
5. PR → ITA : {PRID,N}KITA
6. ITA : PDRID = italu(PRID, drlu(N))
7. ITA → DRi : { PDRID,N,{NHEMED}KDRi}KDRi
8. DRi : drup(PDRID,N,NHEMED)
This table should be read in conjunction with the commentary provided in the text.BMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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Privacy and Confidentiality Protection Committees (PCPCs)
are independent bodies which authorise record linkage of
data held by two or more Disease Registers and oversee the
use of such data by researchers. The scope of the PCPCs
oversight would be limited to the use of the data held by
the Identifier Translation Agency and by the Population Reg-
ister. Ethics committees or institutional review boards of
each Disease Register would still need to approve the con-
tribution of data to a cross-register linkage study.
Secure Research Facilities are also organisationally and
physically distinct from other elements of the system.
Their role is to provide a secure environment in which
data from different Disease Registers can be linked at the
person or event level and the resulting compound data
sets made available to researchers for analysis. Secure Re-
search Facilities never have access to directly or indirectly
identified data, but they do receive potentially re-identifiable
data on behalf of researchers. Only aggregated informa-
tion is ever allowed to leave these facilities, after carefully
scrutiny by facility staff to ensure that it is anonymous.
Researchers first formulate a research proposal which is
submitted to a PCPC for approval. The PCPC then in-
structs the relevant Disease Registers to forward the re-
quired data to a nominated Secure Research Facility. Each
Disease Register first maps the person/Disease Register-specif-
ic IDs, which it uses to identify each case or event, to a new
series of arbitrary ID numbers which are specific to each
research project and which are used only once, for that
project. The PCPC also requests that the Disease Registers
involved forward these mappings to the Identifier Transla-
tion Agency. Using these project-specific mappings and its
database of correspondences between person/Disease Regis-
ter IDs, the Identifier Translation Agency returns a mapping
to the Secure Research Facility which allows it to determin-
istically (and thus, accurately and efficiently) link the Dis-
ease Register records it has received for that research
project. These linked records are then made available to
the researchers for use only within the physical and digital
confines of the Secure Research Facility.
Some studies may require the direct follow-up of the cases
known to a Disease Register. In these circumstances,
names, addresses and other directly-identifying  informa-
tion could be supplied to researchers with the co-opera-
tion of the relevant Disease Register, the Identifier
Translation Agency and the Population Register. The business
rules under which the Population Register and the Identifier
Translation Agency operate might stipulate that approval
by two independent PCPCs is required before such a re-
lease of directly-identified information could take place.
In addition, PCPCs might be guided by information about
individuals' wishes with respect to such direct participa-
tion in research. This information about individuals'
wishes could be captured as part of the original notifica-
tion to each Disease Register, using a standardised format
similar to that being developed by the World Wide Web
Consortium as part of the Platform for Privacy Preferences
Project (P3P) [15]. This would allow direct contact by re-
searchers to be restricted to those individuals who have in-
dicated their willingness to be approached about follow-
up studies or about novel uses of the information which
they have contributed to particular Disease Registers.
Caulfield et al. have suggested an authorisation model, as
an alternative to "one-time consent", which would be very
appropriate for the system proposed here [16]. Whether
patients can opt out of having their medical details (but
not their identity) automatically forwarded to a Disease
Register depends on whether the Disease Register has been
established under legislation which requires mandatory
notification – for example, in Australia, notification of
cancer to cancer registries is required by law.
Related work
The system as proposed above, which was first articulated
in this form in [17], marries the well-established technol-
ogy of public key encryption with a number of ideas
which have been described previously in various guises.
The first idea is the separation of identifying details, such
as name and date-of-birth, from all other substantive data
items prior to the linkage of records between files. In
1979, Boruch and Cecil described a method for linking
survey or administrative data files held by different agen-
cies [18][19]. Agency A sends the identifying details plus
arbitrary record-level code numbers, but no other infor-
mation, to Agency B. Agency B then matches these identi-
fiers to its own file, and after removing the identifying
details, sends the file plus the matched Agency A code
numbers to the researchers. Agency A also sends its file,
similarly stripped of identifying details, to the researchers.
The researchers then link the two files using the Agency A
code numbers which are present in both files.
Pommerening et al. [20] described a technique for im-
proving privacy and security in cancer registries, necessi-
tated by changes in German privacy legislation, which
achieves the same effect. Their method involves dividing
the cancer registry into two operationally distinct offices.
The first office receives notifications and handles all com-
munication with notifying health care providers. The per-
sonal identifiers on each notification are encrypted before
passing the records to the second office, which links the
new data to its database using the encrypted identifiers.
Blobel provides further details of this system [21]. Ho sub-
sequently described and obtained a United States patent
for a system which stores personal identifiers in a database
which is administered separately from another databaseBMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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used to store medical or other substantive details
[22][23]. The first database maps directly identifying infor-
mation such as name and date-of-birth into a code
number which is used to identify records belonging to in-
dividuals in the second database. Medical or substantive
data is encrypted by the originator using a key shared with
the second database. This encrypted data is forwarded by
the first database to the second database together with the
appropriate code number. Quantin et al. [24][25] have de-
scribed a system which uses hashed linkage keys, based on
an ensemble of partial identifiers such as name, sex and
date-of-birth, for epidemiological and health service eval-
uation follow-up studies. A United States patent has also
been granted to the Ford Motor Company for a system
which uses a "privacy data escrow agent" to perform a
similar role to that of the Identifier Translation Agency pro-
posed in this paper [26].
The second idea is the use of unique personal identifica-
tion numbers with very limited scope. Szolovits et al. [27]
and Anderson [28] have identified the hazards to personal
privacy and confidentiality associated with simple unique
health care identification numbers which have a wide
scope. Kohane et al. subsequently proposed a framework
of unique health care identifiers of limited or varying
scope, known as the Health Information Identification
and De-identification Toolkit (HIDIT) [29], as a means of
avoiding some of these hazards.
Together, the Identifier Translation Agency and the Confi-
dentiality and Privacy Protection Committees have similar
roles to those played by the Personal Data Protection Au-
thority in the Icelandic Healthcare Database [30]. Howev-
er, in the Icelandic system, the Personal Data Protection
Authority has access to both directly and indirectly identified
information and the associated medical and genetic de-
tails of individuals, and thus represents a single point at
which privacy and confidentiality might be compromised.
The proposed system also bears some resemblance to the
use of "Federated Network Identities" and pseudonyms
proposed by the Liberty Alliance Project, which is an ini-
tiative of a broad spectrum of industries intended to pro-
mote "e-commerce" without compromising the privacy
and security of individually identitifying information
[31]. However, the Liberty Alliance proposal allows pseu-
donyms to be shared amongst consortia of organisations,
whereas the pseudonyms (that is, the person/Disease Regis-
ter-specific IDs) in the system proposed here are specific to
each Disease Register and are not shared with other organ-
isations.
Most recently, Kelman et al. [32] have described data han-
dling protocols for epidemiological record linkage studies
which incorporate many of the preceding ideas. The ad-
ministrative procedures which they describe would serve
as an excellent foundation for a set of business rules gov-
erning the record linkage process as proposed above.
Distinguishing features of the system
The system proposed in this paper differs from those men-
tioned above in a number of important ways. Firstly, all
directly and indirectly identifying information is effectively
separated from the medical or other substantive details at
the earliest opportunity – that is, at the source of the noti-
fication. Secondly, public key encryption is used through-
out the system to maintain the separation between
identifying information and medical details at all stages of
processing. It is also used to ensure the authenticity, integ-
rity and privacy of all message exchanges between parties
to the system. Thirdly, a single Population Register, which is
responsible for the linkage of all directly and indirectly iden-
tifying information, is effectively shared, via the Identifier
Translation Agency, by multiple Disease Registers. Fourthly,
the Identifier Translation Agency is used as a proxy to obfus-
cate the source of information flowing into the Population
Register and to limit the scope and use of the unique IDs
assigned to individuals by the Population Register. Fifthly,
the Identifier Translation Agency does not have access to any
privileged information – it acts solely as a conduit for en-
crypted messages which it cannot itself decrypt, and as a
translator between sets of arbitrary ID numbers which
have no intrinsic meaning or interpretation. In this way
the hazards associated with the use of a unique personal
identifying number, which has widespread currency
throughout the health system, are avoided.
However, the most important feature of the system pro-
posed here is that the improvement in the protection of
privacy and confidentiality stems from its underlying ar-
chitecture, rather than from the need for perpetual and
unfailing observance of additional administrative and
procedural safeguards by disease register staff. Anderson
has identified the difficulty of effectively instituting "sep-
aration of duties" within a single organisation as a weak-
ness in the security of many health information systems
[33]. The proposed system structurally enforces those sep-
arations.
Disease registers have an excellent track record on security
and the maintenance of confidentiality. However, it is im-
portant to recognise that as they and other electronic
health data collections become more numerous and ac-
cess to them is extended to more people, there is an in-
creasing likelihood of accidental or deliberate breaches of
confidentiality, possibly on a large scale. The protection
provided by the system proposed here is based on the ad-
ministrative, physical and digital separation of data, rath-
er than on the assumption that people will always behave
as they should.BMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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Legal, legislative and governance considerations
Careful attention to issues of legal protection and govern-
ance would be required in order for a comprehensive sys-
tem such as this to be accepted by the general community
and by health care providers.
The Identifier Translation Agency requires the greatest legal
protection because it holds the links between health infor-
mation held by Disease Registers and information on indi-
vidual identities held by the Population Register. Ideally, it
would be established under legislative arrangements
which provide it with complete independence from gov-
ernment departments and ministries, and with immunity
from legal processes such as subpoena by courts. The Iden-
tifier Translation Agency and the Privacy and Confidentiality
Protection Committees should also be legislatively bound to
a set of operational rules which make explicit the ethical
standards against which proposals to link information
held by other elements of the system are evaluated. These
rules, and the need for the absolute independence of the
Identifier Translation Agency and the Privacy and Confidenti-
ality Protection Committees, must be well understood and
accepted by the community, which is effectively entrust-
ing the ongoing protection of its privacy and confidential-
ity to them. Community ownership of the principles
which underlie the system is also important in protecting
it against possible malfeasance by future governments of
unknown disposition and ideology.
It would be desirable if the Population Register and each
Disease Register also had similar legislative protection and
independent governance, but this is not essential. Indeed,
the system could even be implemented within a single or-
ganisation, covering only one or a few data collections,
provided that the Identifier Translation Agency was exter-
nally administered and adequate digital and physical in-
dependence of the various elements could be established
and maintained.
It may be possible for existing organisations to fulfil some
of these roles. Apart from some modifications to their in-
formation systems, the operation of Health Care Providers
would not be affected. Existing Disease Registers could con-
tinue to function, but would no longer need to devote re-
sources to the task of matching the identities in incoming
notifications to their databases – this task would be ceded
to the Population Register, hopefully with some gain in ef-
ficiency due to greater automation and economy of scale.
In many jurisdictions it is likely that public- or private-sec-
tor organisations already exist with the technical and or-
ganisational capacity to undertake the roles of the
Identifier Translation Agency and the Population Register. The
key question is whether these organisations are sufficient-
ly independent, both physically and administratively,
from other entities in the proposed system to ensure ade-
quate separation of roles. This requirement would proba-
bly rule out most government agencies, although
publicly-owned independent corporations might be suit-
able. As noted previously, governance of these organisa-
tions needs to be via business and operational rules,
preferably enshrined in legislation, rather by direct con-
trol by elected representatives or the executive arm of gov-
ernment.
Some form of centralised funding, such as a direct budget
allocation by a government body, is likely to be necessary
to establish the infrastructure required by the proposed
system, particularly the Identifier Translation Agency and
the Population Register. Grants-in-aid might also be made
available to Health Care Providers and existing Disease Reg-
isters to assist with the modification of their information
systems.
Many different mechanisms for ongoing funding are pos-
sible: for example, the Identifier Translation Agency and the
Population Register might together charge each Disease Reg-
ister an annual fee for the services which they provide.
Similarly, Secure Research Facilities and even Privacy and
Confidentiality Protection Committees might charge re-
searchers a fee on a cost-recovery basis for the use of their
services. Clearly some changes would be needed to the
way in which research which uses disease registers is fund-
ed, but the overall cost to society of undertaking such re-
search should be no greater than at present. Given that the
proposed system would facilitate cross-register research,
the societal cost-benefit ratio of operating disease registers
may actually fall.
Risk and hazard assessment
When assessing the protection of privacy and confidenti-
ality provided by a health information system, it is impor-
tant to consider not only the risk of security breaches but
also the hazards associated with them. Perhaps the worst-
case scenario for a disease register, and therefore the max-
imum hazard, would be the misappropriation of the in-
formation held by the register and its publication on the
Internet. Such misappropriation might be carried out by
external attackers, or by internal staff who misuse their
privileged access rights. It might involve direct access to
the register database or eavesdropping on and incremen-
tal copying of notifications sent to the register. Although
such scenarios are unlikely, they are nevertheless possible
and must therefore be contemplated.
In the case of a conventional disease register which holds
fully identified information, publication could be devas-
tating for individuals whose details were released, and
would almost certainly curtail further operation of the
register (and perhaps others like it) as a result of public
outrage.BMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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For the system proposed here, such an event would still be
serious, but not quite so disastrous. If the Population Regis-
ter were compromised, then at worst a list of names, dates
of birth, residential addresses and other demographic de-
tails of selected members of the population would be dis-
covered. Publication of residential addresses and dates of
birth may be distressing for some people. However no in-
formation about why the identities of particular individu-
als appear in the Population Register would be released,
except for the inference that those people had at some
stage been the subject of a notification to a Disease Regis-
ter. As the number of Disease Registers which participate in
the system increases, the impact of such inference de-
clines. This could also be thwarted by "seeding" the Popu-
lation Register with publicly available lists of identified
information which cover a large proportion of the general
population, such as electoral rolls or even telephone di-
rectories. The publication of the unique identification
number assigned by the Population Register in conjunction
with names and other identifying information would not
compromise the entire system because the Population Reg-
ister ID number is used only by the Identifier Translation
Agency, which, like the Population Register, does not hold
any medical or health information. Similarly publication
of the identification number translation tables held by the
Identifier Translation Agency would also have only a limited
impact since the information has meaning only to Disease
Registers and the Population Register. Because all elements
of the system are physically and administratively distinct,
operated by different staff and, ideally, using dissimilar
computer systems, the probability that one element of the
system is compromised, either by external attackers or ma-
licious insiders, should be largely independent of the
probability of compromise of any other element of the
system.
However, a breach in the security of a Disease Register
could still have serious consequences. Although each Dis-
ease Register does not hold any directly or indirectly identify-
ing data items, the information which is held by it may
still be potentially re-identifiable. It is therefore important
that Disease Registers are supplied with only as much med-
ical and other health information as they need to fulfil
their core functions. The system proposed here would cer-
tainly not obviate the need for careful attention to physi-
cal, administrative and electronic security, particularly by
Disease Registers. A means of dealing with this problem is
suggested in a later section of this paper.
Another hazard is deliberate sabotage of one of the ele-
ments of the proposed system by an external or internal
agent. The proposed system would not change the risk or
magnitude of this hazard for Health Care Providers and
Disease Registers. However, the centralised nature of the
Population Register and the Identifier Translation Agency sig-
nificantly increases the magnitude of the hazard posed by
sabotage of these elements. For example, a saboteur might
incorrectly merge identities maintained by the Population
Register, which would result in erroneous merging of cases
on Disease Register databases. The Disease Registers would
have no way of knowing whether these changes were jus-
tified or not.
It is likely that such sabotage would eventually be detected
through audits of the Population Register (described be-
low), and the Disease Register databases could be corrected
by reverting to back-ups and replaying corrected versions
of their transaction logs. However such fixes would be
costly and research projects undertaken with the incorrect
data may be invalidated. One solution would be to oper-
ate two independent sets of Population Registers and the
Identifier Translation Agencies in parallel. The risk that both
sets of central agencies would be subject to sabotage si-
multaneously would be very small. Health Care Providers
would need to send separately encrypted Health Event No-
tifications  to each of the duplicate Identifier Translation
Agencies. Disease Registers would only modify their data-
bases if they received consistent information from both
"arms" of the system. Business rules to resolve cases in
which conflicting information was received would be re-
quired. Such redundancy would clearly increase the cost
of establishing and operating the proposed system, but
might also be justified on disaster recovery and other con-
tinuity-of-service grounds.
Extension of the system beyond disease registers
It is possible to extend the system proposed above simply
by establishing additional registers. These registers could
accommodate almost any type of laboratory or clinical
data and could be established at a low marginal cost. This
is because: i) the privacy protection arrangements for reg-
isters will already be in place and accepted by the commu-
nity and health care providers; ii) one of the most
expensive aspects of register operation, that of matching
the identities of incoming notifications to records already
on the register database, is handled centrally by the Popu-
lation Register, with consequent economies of scale.
There are many additional types of register which could be
established under the umbrella of this system. "Clinical
databases" as described by Black and Payne [34] are obvi-
ous possibilities, but other candidates include "registers"
containing the responses to population-based health sta-
tus and health risk factor surveys, and even registers of so-
cial characteristics, such as unemployment status, income
level and educational attainment. Controlled linkage of
these "social characteristic registers" to various health sta-
tus registers would permit the precise and ongoing moni-
toring of the effects which specific lifestyle and socio-BMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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economic factors have on particular health outcomes, and
vice-versa.
The system could also address many of the privacy issues
associated with genetic databases. Genetic databases con-
tain realised genotype information about individual sub-
jects. With the advent of micro-arrays and other tools for
the characterisation of individual genomes, tissue banks
and blood sample collections should perhaps be thought
of as databases of latent genotype information
[35][36][37]. Tissue banks and blood sample collections
would act as physical repositories for samples and as data
stores for realised genotype information, but would be re-
quired to operate in conjunction with a "tissue register".
Institutions would assign a unique, arbitrary ID number
to each sample before sending the material to the tissue
bank or blood sample collection. Institutions would also
send a corresponding "notification" to the Identifier Trans-
lation Agency, comprising i) the demographic, medical and
other details for each tissue or blood sample, encrypted
with the public key of the tissue register; ii) the sample ID
number, encrypted with the public key of the Identifier
Translation Agency; and c) the directly and indirectly identi-
fying personal details, encrypted with the public key of the
Population Register. The Identifier Translation Agency would
map the sample ID to a new, unique tissue register ID
number and would forward this, together with the still-
encrypted medical details, to the tissue register. The tissue
register ID would also be mapped by the Identifier Transla-
tion Agency to the Population Register ID returned to it by
the Population Register, in the usual fashion. Thus, tissue
banks (and blood sample collections) would have access
to anonymous genetic material and derived genotype infor-
mation. Tissue registers would hold medical and demo-
graphic details for each sample, but no directly or indirectly
identifying information, and would not have access to any
genetic material or genotype information. Tissue banks
would need to formally apply to a PCPC in order to obtain
the authorisation required to link their samples to the cor-
responding medical and demographic details held by the
tissue register. Similarly, tissue registers would require a
PCPC to forward an authorisation to the Identifier Transla-
tion Agency before the tissue register could link its data to
data held by a Disease Register.
Technical implementation
There do not appear to be any major technical impedi-
ments to the implementation of the system proposed in
this paper. PKI software is widely available now that the
United States patent on the most popular algorithm for
public key cryptography has expired and export restric-
tions on cryptographic software have been relaxed by
most governments. Standards and frameworks for the
communication of structured health information, such as
HL7 [38] or CorbaMED [39], are now widely accepted.
The functionality of the Population Register is available in a
number of off-the-shelve software products which con-
form to the CorbaMED Person Identification Service
(PIDS) specification [40].
There are a number of reasons why it would be desirable
to implement the system proposed in this paper using
free, open source software components. [41] Firstly, much
of the data processing infrastructure required by the sys-
tem needs to be shared by many participants. It therefore
makes sense to defray the cost of developing, customising
and maintaining these components for many different
computing platforms by making the program code freely
available and modifiable under an open source license.
Secondly, there needs to be a high degree of community
confidence in the security and technical excellence of the
system components. A fundamental principle of cryptog-
raphy, enunciated 120 years ago by Auguste Kerckhoffs, is
that the only parts of a cryptographic system which should
be kept secret are the keys – it should be assumed that the
implementation and algorithmic details for any system
will eventually fall into the hands of the enemy, so it is
best to make them available for open scrutiny from the
outset [42]. Open source licensing would permit broad-
based and ongoing auditing of the software components
used by the system.
At the time of writing, at least one scalable, open source,
probabilistic record linkage engine suitable for use in the
Population Register was known to be under development
[43]. Mature public key infrastructure and store-and-for-
ward communication components are also freely availa-
ble, but other parts of the system would need to be
specially written. There is no reason why this work could
not be shared by groups located in many countries.
Weaknesses and possible solutions
There are a number of potential weaknesses in the system
proposed in this paper. These include its apparent com-
plexity and the need for all participating parties to adopt
and adhere to information standards and protocols. De-
spite the apparent complexity, it should be possible to
promote the system to legislators and the general public
in quite simple terms: names, addresses and other identi-
fying information are split off from medical details at
source and are separately transmitted and stored at all
stages thereafter. Incorporation of the required data
processing standards and protocols should not present
difficulties for new information systems or existing sys-
tems undergoing major revision, but may be problematic
for "legacy" systems.
Another weakness of the system as proposed is the resid-
ual hazard posed by the potentially re-identifiable informa-
tion held by each Disease Register. One method ofBMC Medical Research Methodology 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/3/1
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reducing this hazard would be to "vertically partition"
those Disease Registers which hold particularly sensitive
data into a series of "sub-Registers", each of which would
receive and accumulate only a small subset of the data
items required by a Disease Register as a whole for each
case of disease (or for each health event). From a security
standpoint, it would be quite acceptable for sub-Registers
belonging to different Disease Registers to be co-located
and co-administered. Such sharing of resources by unre-
lated sub-Registers would substantially reduce the marginal
cost of vertically partitioning Disease Registers in this way.
Subsets of sub-Register data would generally need to be re-
assembled into complete Disease Register data sets (which
are potentially re-identifiable) inside Secure Research Facili-
ties in order to carry out complex statistical analyses. How-
ever, selection of those research subsets, as well as routine
reporting and other descriptive epidemiology, could be
carried out without re-assembling the vertically parti-
tioned sub-Register data, through the use of "fusion que-
ries" as described by Yernini et al. [44]. This would appear
to be a fruitful area for further research and development.
Perhaps the most significant weakness of the system is the
high degree of trust which Disease Registers must place in
the Population Register to do its job correctly. If the Popula-
tion Register fails to determine that two identities represent
the same person, or vice-versa, then Disease Registers may
incorrectly interpret two notifications of the same case of
disease as representing two cases, or two notifications as
incorrectly representing the same case. This is a problem
which already afflicts most disease registers to some de-
gree – the critical question is how much worse would a
centralised identity matching agency, which does not have
access to any medical details, be at this task? Kelman et al.
[32] have suggested that the inevitable reduction in the ef-
fectiveness of identity matching may be an unavoidable
cost which researchers and Disease Registers have to pay in
order to permit their work to continue in an environment
in which privacy is given greater importance than in the
past. At the very least, the magnitude of this currently un-
quantified trade-off in matching effectiveness needs to be
measured through empirical studies. Even if the loss of
matching effectiveness is small, it would be possible to al-
low Disease Registers to link their databases with that of the
Population Register (via the Identifier Translation Agency
mappings) from time to time in order to carry out audits
of the effectiveness of the identity matching provided by
the Population Register, and to suggest merges and splitting
of identities based on the extra medical information held
by the Disease Registers. Such audits would need to be un-
dertaken at a Secure Research Facility, under strict and inde-
pendent supervision, to ensure that the identity and
disease information were brought together only transient-
ly and that no copies of the linked information were re-
tained by anyone.
Summary
The system proposed in this paper offers the prospect of a
federation of disease registers and genetic and social data-
bases which would simultaneously provide better protec-
tion of personal privacy and maintenance of
confidentiality, while enabling cheaper and more efficient
linking of data for research purposes.
To many readers, it might seem unlikely that the level of
community consensus necessary for the commissioning
of such a system could ever be achieved. This may be true,
but we must be careful not to overlook the potential for
building intrinsically more secure population-based
health information systems provided by modern, net-
worked computing environments. It is therefore impor-
tant that alternatives to traditional methods for collecting,
storing and using biomedical and social research data are
proposed and consequently exposed to scrutiny by infor-
mation security experts, researchers and interested mem-
bers of the general community, alike. This will take time.
In the interim, it may be possible to implement the pro-
posed system in the more circumscribed environments of
consortia of health care institutions which are engaged in
collaborative research.
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